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China’s increasing engagement in Africa has generated heated debates over 
the extent to which its activities are exploitative or developmental. There 
is particular concern over China’s impact on governance in fragile states. 
However, these debates often make generalisations and leave out African 
agency. This Policy Briefing takes a closer look at Rwanda and the Democratic 
Republic of Congo, and finds that there is a large gap between China’s policy 
and practice. It finds that the ways in which African actors promote, respond to 
and negotiate its engagement is crucial in shaping the extent to which China 
contributes to development.
“Such debates 
treat Africa 
as a passive 
beneficiary 
or victim, 
obscuring the 
diversity of 
dynamics and 
relationships 
between 
Chinese and 
African actors 
in different 
localities.”
 Is China’s Role in African 
 Fragile States Exploitative 
 or Developmental?
China’s controversial rise
China’s unprecedented growth has 
been accompanied by an intensification 
of public and private involvement 
in Africa. Between 2009 and 2012, 
China’s investment in Africa grew at an 
annual rate of 20.5 per cent. In 2012, 
the total volume of China-Africa trade 
reached US$198.49bn, a year-on-year 
growth of 19.3 per cent. By 2013, it 
had exceeded US$200bn. This has led 
to increasing debate about whether 
China is a development collaborator, an 
economic competitor, or a coloniser. 
From one perspective, some see China’s 
engagement as an opportunity for 
African countries to reduce dependency 
on Western aid and its paternalistic 
conditionalities. They point to China’s 
investment, trade and aid, particularly 
in building infrastructure, as significant 
contributors to Africa’s development. 
Meanwhile, an alternative viewpoint 
is that the relationship is unequal and 
exploitative, driven by China’s need for 
access to natural resources and export 
markets for its manufactured goods. 
They draw attention to China’s labour 
and environmental practices, the threats 
Chinese businesses pose to African ones, 
the use of imported Chinese labour, and 
the lack of knowledge and skills transfer 
as reasons for scepticism about China’s 
development impact on the continent. 
They also criticise China for exacerbating 
governance issues as a result of its 
lack of concern for human rights and 
accountability at home, and its policy 
of ‘non-interference’, which dilutes 
the effect of Western conditionalities 
and sanctions aimed at improving 
governance. 
Such debates treat Africa as a passive 
beneficiary or victim, obscuring the 
diversity of dynamics and relationships 
between Chinese and African actors in 
different localities. This project focused 
on Rwanda and the Democratic Republic 
of Congo (DRC) to delve deeper into the 
nature and form of these relationships 
to identify the implications of China’s 
involvement for development and 
governance in fragile states. 
China’s discourse on aid, 
governance and development
China’s relationship with African 
nations is framed by its foreign policy 
discourse of ‘Peaceful Development and 
Harmonious World’. Chinese officials 
promise African countries relationships 
based upon the values of political 
equality, mutual benefit, ‘win-win’ 
cooperation, cultural exchange, and 
non-interference. There is a close link between 
China’s domestic affairs and its approach 
to external relations. The principle of non-
interference in African politics stems from 
China’s intolerance of foreign interference in 
its own affairs. 
At the same time, the legitimacy of the 
Chinese state is dependent upon its ability to  
deliver economic development to its citizens. 
Therefore, while Western states who value 
civic and political rights talk about ‘good 
governance’, Chinese officials, who prioritise 
social and economic rights talk of ‘effective 
governance’. Thus, China’s approach to 
governance in Africa is to pay close attention 
to who effective partners are on the ground 
and to build capacities rather than pressing 
for the rule of law as a first priority. China’s 
emphasis on building infrastructure, including 
transport, hospitals and education reflects 
this prioritisation of building capacities. 
The Chinese slogan ‘development first, 
governance second’, illustrates China’s 
belief that overcoming state fragility is first 
and foremost about improving economic 
conditions rather than being preoccupied 
with political governance. 
 
China’s engagement in Africa is typically 
conceptualised as monolithic; led by the 
Communist Party and played out by its large 
state-owned enterprises. However, there 
is a widening range of Chinese players on 
the African continent who are engaged in 
different sectors and at different national and 
sub-national levels. 
This diversity of interests gives rise to tensions 
and contradictions between bureaucratic 
bodies tasked with advancing China’s overall 
national interest and Chinese corporates 
operating in Africa. 
Case studies: the DRC and Rwanda
China’s engagement in Rwanda and the 
DRC is mainly driven by its need for natural 
resources and access to consumer markets. 
Although Rwanda has nowhere near the 
amount of natural resources as the DRC, its 
support for the ‘One China’ policy as well as to 
China as a responsible stakeholder in global-level 
forums is valuable. For both countries, China 
is an attractive source of investment and aid 
because it provides an alternative to traditional 
donors, increasing their negotiating options 
in order to maximise assistance. China’s state 
capitalism also allows it to make longer-term 
commitments and take on building large 
infrastructure projects at lower costs. 
 
Democratic Republic of Congo
China’s main interest in the DRC lies in 
accessing minerals such as cobalt, copper 
and diamonds. It is the DRC’s largest trading 
partner. Additionally, there are strong, 
historical ties between the Chinese and DRC 
leadership: President Joseph Kabila was 
educated in China, while his late father, former 
president Laurent-Désiré, enjoyed political 
support from the Chinese. Such ties provide 
the kind of personal bonds which are essential 
to how Chinese political culture works. 
In 2008, the two governments signed a 
deal worth US$9bn, guaranteeing Chinese 
access to minerals in exchange for building 
infrastructure. China’s Export-Import Bank 
pledged to build or restore over 3,500km of 
roads and 3,200km of railroads, 32 hospitals, 
145 health centres and two universities in the 
DRC. In effect, this is an exchange of mining 
rights in return for critical infrastructure. Some 
observers believe it is a model that is being 
rolled-out by China and its enterprises across 
Africa. The agreement has not been free of 
criticism. Whilst specific details have been kept 
confidential, critics claimed that the Chinese 
parties received fiscal and customs exemptions. 
This raised criticism that these exemptions 
could limit the DRC’s ability to collect revenue 
and the International Monetary Fund has 
expressed concern over its ability to service 
its debt. The agreement also included a clause 
that exempted the venture from any new laws 
passed, leading to claims that this undermined 
the DRC’s ability to reform policies in areas 
such as taxation, customs, human rights and 
environmental protection. 
However, such clauses are, in fact, standard 
practice in international law. Indeed, all major, 
long-term natural resources agreements are 
exempt from changes in national laws. Such 
agreements tend to be internationalised, 
with provision for international arbitration, 
usually through the World Bank’s CSID 
(Centre for the Settlement of Investment 
Disputes). The DRC is party to a range of 
investment guarantee agreements, including 
the Multilateral Investment Guarantee 
Agency (MIGA) specialised in insurance 
against political and other non-commercial 
risks; the New York Convention on the 
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“While Western 
states who 
value civic 
and political 
rights talk 
about ‘good 
governance’, 
Chinese 
officials, who 
prioritise social 
and economic 
rights talk 
of ‘effective 
governance’.”
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“As its investment 
in fragile states 
grows, China 
has become 
increasingly 
interested in the 
ways in which 
the West has 
tried to handle 
African problems 
in the past and is 
opening up to the 
idea of dialogue 
with Western 
and non-Western 
donors and 
international 
agencies.”
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign 
Arbitral Awards; the OHADA (Organization 
for the Harmonization of African Business 
Law) Treaty; and the African Trade Insurance 
Agency (ATIA). Exemption from taxation and 
customs are also typical. China has accepted a 
substantial investment risk to develop DRC’s 
mining resources where other countries 
have not. Its control of the disbursement of 
the expenditure for the development of the 
project could be seen as a positive example 
of China’s contribution to DRC’s governance 
aims, besides providing a guarantee for debt 
reimbursement. The agreement means that 
a major part of its public affairs management 
is committed to the development project and 
cannot be diverted for short-term, populist, or 
even corrupt goals.
Such concerns for good governance in mining 
in DRC influenced the implementation 
of the initial Sino-Congolese cooperation 
programme. The Congolese government 
renegotiated and reshaped the Chinese 
contract. However, as one interviewee said, 
‘In a global world, preaching good governance 
without investing significantly in improving 
the economy by dynamic and daring actors is 
not sustainable’. The access to decent income 
seems a better way to enhance individual 
capabilities, together with improving the living 
conditions of populations. 
The DRC does, however, get some dividends 
from Chinese cooperation. The whole 
economy benefits from the resulting 
improved infrastructure. However, the deal 
has resulted in the closure of local civil 
engineering companies. In addition, public 
agencies such as the Roads Office, the Office 
of Urban Roads and Canalization, and the 
Office for Country Roads are not properly 
funded to take over the maintenance of these 
infrastructures, which puts into question their 
long-term sustainability.
The Sino-Congolese cooperation experience 
confirms that the establishment of ‘win-
win’ relations between financially and 
technologically unequal partners can still bring 
benefits to both partners.
Rwanda
Rwanda has been successful in managing 
Chinese involvement. Since the genocide, 
Rwanda has strengthened its government, 
implemented wide-ranging reforms to attract 
investment, and elaborated ‘Vision 2020’, 
its national development strategy. In 2011, 
Rwanda was the second fastest growing 
economy in sub-Saharan Africa. In 2013, 
Rwanda’s gross domestic product growth rate 
was 4.7 per cent, its lowest rate since 2003. 
In the past few years, Rwanda’s trade with 
China has grown faster than with any of its 
other partners, doubling from 2009 to 2012 
to reach a value of US$160m. 
Rwanda has proactively facilitated investment 
and trade with China by including Rwandan 
business people in its official delegations 
to China and establishing a Rwanda 
Development Board office in Shenzhen, 
which promotes opportunities and advises 
the Rwandan government on policies 
that will encourage Chinese investment. 
Contrary to popular views, most of China’s 
investments are not in the natural resources 
sector, but in transformative sectors such as 
telecommunications and manufacturing.
Rwanda has particularly targeted information 
and communication technology (ICT) as a 
sector where China can help it become 
a regional leader. It has engaged Chinese 
enterprises such as ZTE and Huawei to provide 
equipment and transfer expertise in order to 
upgrade technology, enhance e-governance 
programmes, and establish a new ICT Park in 
Kigali. Through its diplomatic engagement, 
Rwanda has also been approved as an official 
tourist destination for Chinese citizens as well 
as for tariff-free access to 95 per cent of its 
exports to China. 
When Rwanda was accused of supporting the 
M23 rebel group in the DRC, Western donors 
withdrew their aid. However, just as the cuts 
were beginning to hurt the economy, China 
gave Rwanda US$35m in interest-free loans 
and grants, despite China’s strong support 
for Kabila’s government in the DRC. Thus, 
we can see that China has not developed a 
comprehensive framework for dealing with 
this inter-state crisis politically. Its traditional 
inclination is to remain outside conflicts 
for which it does not have any deep, direct 
knowledge and experience. However, as 
China is involved in both countries and even 
contributes to the peacekeeping mission in 
the DRC, it will need to develop a framework 
for analysis beyond its philosophy of resilient 
state development. 
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1. 
Policy implications
1. China’s approach to governance is very much linked to its own development 
experience. China views concepts such as transparency, participation and 
the rule of law as ethnocentric Western norms. Rather than talking of ‘good 
governance’, China focuses on ‘effective governance’, building real capacities, and 
pragmatic engagement with partners on the ground that will lead to long-term 
partnerships that are mutually beneficial. China’s view is that overcoming state 
fragility requires state resilience, without which effective governance cannot be 
reached. However, the motives and modalities of China’s engagement in Africa 
have changed significantly in recent years and its approach to governance is still 
evolving. This presents opportunities for the international community and African 
states to shape China’s policy and practice so that it contributes positively to 
African development and poverty reduction.
2. Despite Chinese government policy to encourage overseas investment by 
Chinese firms and their perception that this offers a ‘win-win’ strategy 
for Africa, links between Chinese government policy and business sector 
firms are, in practice, relatively weak. Consequently, there are opportunities 
for China’s public and private sectors to build constructive relationships that 
contribute to both Chinese and African development goals. African states can 
also do more to maximise their gains from the relationship by developing multi-
stakeholder frameworks for foreign investment. 
3. China does not seek to shape African states in its own image or interfere in 
politics, but it is realising that it cannot simply pretend that the problems 
of its local partners do not exist, or are exclusively the concerns of those 
countries. As its investment in fragile states grows, China has become 
increasingly interested in the ways in which the West has tried to handle African 
problems in the past and is opening up to the idea of dialogue with Western and 
non-Western donors and international agencies. 
4. China is in Africa for business, it is not in Africa to improve African governance. 
That is a Western way of thinking. China views African development as 
dependent on Africans, not outside partners. While China’s engagement with 
African countries provides for many of the conditions they need to develop 
(investment, infrastructure, opening new markets, better prices for African 
products, etc.), China’s developmental impact will depend on how African 
leaders operate the relationship. Fragile states must create a conducive policy 
environment for investment, promote local investment in joint ventures, and 
train African entrepreneurs so that skills and technology can be transferred. Thus, 
getting basic governance right is necessary for African countries to make the 
most of their relationships with China. 
